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Executive summary
• Four major developments have challenged the status quo and reopened the debate 
on the forms that money will take in the future: 1) use of cash as a medium of exchange has 
declined; 2) distributed ledger technology (DLT) has led to the emergence of thousands 
of digital cryptocurrencies; 3) some global tech giants are planning to provide private 
digital currencies to their billions of users in the form of stablecoins; and 4) in turn, public 
authorities are thinking about providing their own digital currencies to the general public.
• These developments raise questions about the implications for financial stability, the 
transmission of monetary policy and financial intermediation. This Policy Contribution 
focuses on the consequences stablecoins and central bank digital currencies could have.
• Stablecoins, such as Facebook’s Libra, differ from earlier generations of cryptocur-
rencies in three fundamental ways. First, they would start with large networks of users and 
global accessibility, two pivotal features for the critical uptake of a new currency. Second, 
given the current limitations of DLT, including in terms of energy efficiency, new stable-
coins would rely on (more) centralised systems to validate transactions. Third, stablecoins 
would focus particularly on reducing the volatility in the value of the new currency.
• These new features of stablecoins attempt to correct some of the critical deficiencies 
identified in first-generation cryptocurrencies, which meant they did not acquire the main 
functions of money. However, new stablecoins raise other questions and potentially create 
new problems. One issue could arise from the more centralised (permissioned) validation 
system, which could lead to collusion problems. Another issue could arise from the reserve 
system that is supposed to ensure the stability of stablecoins, such as Libra, which could be 
incompatible with the profit maximisation behaviour of a private issuer. 
• Facebook’s Libra plan has been a wake-up call to central banks and governments 
which, afraid of losing their monetary sovereignty, have renewed their interest in central 
bank digital currencies (CBDCs) as a potential solution. CBDCs could make private digital 
currencies less attractive and slow down their adoption.  
• But there are other reasons to give the general public access to central bank liabilities. 
One important reason to provide CBDCs to citizens is that if cash disappears, citizens will 
lose direct access to sovereign money. Another benefit of the introduction of CBDCs is that 
monetary policy could be strengthened by transmitting it directly to the general public. 
• However, the introduction of CBDCs could also be disruptive and create risks. In 
particular, CBDCs could have major consequences for financial intermediation. These 
risks would have to be evaluated by policymakers before any decisions are taken. 
• If CBDCs are introduced, central banks would have to carefully calibrate their proper-
ties to minimise these risks. But, eventually, if these risks – and in particular the risk of 
structural financial disintermediation – do materialise, central banks would have various 
instruments to counter them.
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1 Introduction
Under the Bretton Woods monetary arrangement put in place in 1947, the main global 
currencies were anchored to the US dollar (through a fixed exchange rate) and were, at least 
partially, convertible with gold. This system broke down in 1971 when US President Richard 
Nixon declared a temporary suspension of the dollar’s convertibility into gold. Since then, 
monetary systems in most developed countries have been based on fiat currencies, in other 
words, currencies that are not backed by physical assets but that rely on the ability of mon-
etary authorities to ensure the currency’s stability. These currencies are issued by central 
banks in the form of physical cash (coins and banknotes) and reserves, combined with highly 
regulated bank deposits convertible at par with central bank money. 
The fiat-based monetary system has functioned in this form since the demise of Bretton 
Woods, with only minor innovations. However, four major developments in the last decade 
have challenged the status quo and have re-opened the debate on the forms that money will 
take in the future: 
1. The share of transactions in cash in developed countries has fallen. In countries such 
as Sweden, coins and banknotes have become so marginalised as a means of payment 
that there is even talk of abandoning them completely. The Swedish Riksbank has opted 
against the total elimination of cash, but there is unequivocally a trend towards less cash 
usage.
2. The emergence of distributed-ledger technology, or blockchain (ie a decentralised, secure 
and unchangeable record of financial transactions), has enabled the appearance of thou-
sands of cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, which launched in 2009. This technology has 
since given rise to many private forms of digital money.
3. While the first generations of digital coins proved not to be stable means of payment and 
storing value, more recent versions have explicitly aimed to provide stability. A number of 
so-called ‘stablecoins’ have been issued in recent years, including Tether in 2014, which 
was intended (originally at least) to be fully backed by US dollar reserves, TrueUSD with 
a similar model in 2018, and Basis in 2017, which promised to create an algorithmic 
stablecoin1. The stablecoin idea has now become more prominent, with global tech giant 
Facebook announcing on 18 July 2019 its intention to issue its own fiat-currency-backed 
stablecoin: the Libra. Given its potential to reach millions, if not billions, of users across 
the world, authorities have taken a significant interest in how this might challenge official 
currencies.
4. As a result of these rapid and potentially significant developments, central banks are now 
contemplating the idea of creating central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). These could 
replace coins and banknotes and potentially make central banks’ digital reserves available 
to all economic agents and not only to banks.
These potentially beneficial innovations in conveniently storing value and providing pay-
ments need to be carefully assessed against the costs they potentially entail for citizens. More 
broadly, important questions arise as their popularity increases, pertaining to the transmis-
sion of monetary policy, financial stability and the future of financial intermediation.
In Claeys et al (2018), we proposed a taxonomy for all forms of money, traditional and 
recent innovations, based on three criteria: 1) who the issuer is: government or private; 2) 
what form it takes: physical or digital; and 3) how transactions are settled: centralised or 
decentralised (Figure 1).
1 Despite an original and potentially promising model, Basis shut down its operations in December 2018.
3 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚15 | December 2019
Figure 1: A taxonomy of money
Source: Bruegel updated from Claeys et al (2018). Note: CBDC = central bank digital currency.
Claeys et al (2018) discussed the potential of cryptocurrencies (defined as private, digital, 
decentralised currencies in our taxonomy) to perform the main functions usually attributed 
to ‘money’ and the impact that they might have on monetary policy. This analysis showed that 
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin were not yet able to fulfil the three main functions of money 
(ie to serve as a unit of account, a medium of exchange and a store of value) and that they still 
looked more like speculative assets rather than money. 
The main reason for this is that their inherent volatility, because of, among other things, 
their inelastic supply, limits their widespread adoption as a unit of account and as a medium 
of exchange. International currencies including the US dollar and the euro have established 
track records of providing price stability, which combined with their credible legal status 
and strong networks of users have given them the benefits of natural monopolies. As a result, 
Claeys et al (2018) did not expect any immediate risk that such cryptocurrencies would chal-
lenge central bank currencies, and certainly not the well-established international currencies. 
It would take a deep crisis of trust in official currencies for their widespread substitution by 
cryptocurrencies to materialise. In this context, Demertzis and Wolff (2018) considered at the 
time that there was no immediate need for new regulation, but rather there was an opportu-
nity to learn about what these types of innovations imply in terms of financial risks. 
In the meantime, as long as central bank currencies continue to provide the unit-of-account 
function, central banks’ monetary policies should not lose their grip on their economy. Even-
tually, as a potential competitor to central-bank currencies, cryptocurrencies could even play a 
positive role by acting as a disciplining device to push central banks to take their price-stability 
mandates seriously, especially in countries with histories of bad monetary policy. 
However, the emergence of a second generation of digital coins in the form stablecoins 
(ie private digital currencies, not necessarily decentralised, and possibly backed by fiat-cur-
rency reserves to ensure stability) issued by global tech giants, provides a different challenge. 
Through scale alone, these currencies might be more credible competitors to traditional 
forms of money. This, and in particular Facebook’s Libra plan, has acted as a wake-up call 
for central banks and governments which, afraid of losing their monetary sovereignty, have 
renewed their interest in both the need for regulation and CBDCs as a potential solution.
In this Policy Contribution, we discuss two aspects of the debate on the future of money: 
the implications of the rise of global private stablecoins, and the role that public central bank 
digital currencies (CBDCs) could play in the future.
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2 Should we fear the rise of global 
stablecoins?
What makes recent stablecoin initiatives, such as Facebook’s proposed Libra, more relevant 
for policymakers than the first-generation of cryptocurrencies is their scale. But beyond scale, 
there are two other aspects that are different to the first generation: the (more) centralised 
network and the attempt to reduce volatility in the coins’ value – hence the label ‘stablecoin’.
2.1 Network effects and global scale 
While so far digital currencies have been small-scale (in terms of number of transactions or 
total market capitalisation2), when these initiatives come from tech giants that have access to 
very large networks of users, they become both systemically relevant and have the potential to 
exercise monopoly power. 
This is in contrast to the first generation of cryptocurrencies, which faced high switching 
costs because of network effects. It is not obvious why consumers in the euro area would 
choose to use anything else than the euro, when paying in any other currency, including 
newly created ones, would be costly and inefficient. But as global tech giants already benefit 
from very large networks, a stablecoin issued by them will benefit immediately from scale and 
accessibility, two features that are pivotal for critical uptake of currencies. As Libra could be 
a stablecoin with the necessary scale to become a global currency contender, we discuss its 
main features as a way of understanding how global stablecoins in general might work.
Figure 2: Monthly active Facebook users (millions)
Source: Bruegel via Bloomberg.
Almost ten years after its creation, Bitcoin was estimated in 2017 to have 7.1 million 
owners worldwide3. By means of comparison, the active number of users of Facebook (and 
hence Libra’s immediate network size) is, at around 2.5 billion, much larger than the number 
of people using international currencies such as the euro or even the dollar (Figure 2).
Authorities are thus legitimately concerned that Libra has the necessary scale to become 
a global currency contender without a clear understanding of what this would mean for 
2 See Claeys et al (2018) for details
3 See Alex Lielacher (2019) ‘How Many People Use Bitcoin in 2019?’ Bitcoin Market Journal, 11 February, available at 
https://www.bitcoinmarketjournal.com/how-many-people-use-bitcoin/.
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citizens. Bank of England Governor Mark Carney has pointed out4 that Libra could become 
“instantly systemic” on launch day and should therefore be put under tight regulatory scru-
tiny. Similarly, Financial Stability Board Chair Randal K. Quarles has highlighted the need to 
contain the risks that arise from financial innovation and particularly the “wider use of new 
types of crypto-assets for retail payment purposes would warrant close scrutiny by authorities to 
ensure that that they are subject to high standards of regulation”5.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2019) discussed the complex trade-offs that 
will arise “between financial stability, competition and data protection”. One such complex 
case arises from Calibra, the digital wallet on which Libra will be stored. Currently, there 
are around 200 cryptocurrency wallets6 via which more than 1 600 cryptocurrencies are 
exchanged and on which they are stored. Given that Calibra will be bundled with Facebook’s 
ecosystem and made available to all its users, Facebook will potentially have the power to 
push its customers to use its own digital wallet, just like Amazon had the power to push their 
Kindle e-book reader to many of its customers that used its other services. The potential for a 
massive user base can lead to monopoly power for the issuer, which in turn can lead to severe 
financial vulnerabilities from system failures (either deliberate and fraudulent or simply 
erroneous). 
Furthermore, the Libra Association (2019), the organisation that is planning to control 
Libra, argues that users that use Calibra to store their Libras will share no information about 
their financial transactions with other Facebook extensions. However, the most important 
concern voiced since the Libra announcement in mid-2019 has been distrust about the way 
Facebook operates, particularly in relation to data privacy and Facebook’s global dominance. 
Wolf (2019), for instance, was very critical of Facebook’s continuing failure to appreciate the 
way it is affecting modern democracies. Libra therefore starts with a sizable trust deficit that 
could hinder its promised popularity. There will therefore need to be clarity about how and 
where to regulate this digital wallet.
The European Council and Commission said in November 2019 that “no global stablecoin 
arrangement should begin operation in the European Union until the legal, regulatory and 
oversight challenges and risks have been adequately identified and addressed”7. There are 
still many unknowns about how digital currencies can challenge our commonly understood 
notion of money. And if strong network effects and scale amplify those risks, then policymak-
ers need to be particularly cautious. 
2.2 From decentralised permissionless, to centralised permissioned
As a first-generation technology, the Bitcoin blockchain was a fully decentralised, 
permissionless system, with a public ledger available to all network users. While this 
democratised the process of verification, it came at the expense of time and energy efficiency 
(Krause and Tolaymat, 2018). If Libra is going to exploit the vast scale that it promises, then 
these issues will become serious obstacles. That is why Libra will move back to operating in a 
more centralised system (permissioned blockchain), at least in the initial phase, in which the 
founding members will be in charge of the validator nodes. This will have the aim of ensuring 
4 Reuters (2019) ‘BoE’s Carney says keeping open mind on Facebook’s Libra’, 18 June, available at https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-facebook-crypto-carney/boes-carney-says-keeping-open-mind-on-facebooks-libra-idUSK-
CN1TJ26A.
5 See ‘FSB Chair’s letter to G20 Leaders meeting in Osaka’, 25 June 2019, available at https://www.fsb.org/2019/06/
fsb-chairs-letter-to-g20-leaders-meeting-in-osaka/.
6 A cryptocurrency wallet is a device, physical medium, programme or service that stores the public and/or private 
keys and can be used to track ownership, receive or spend cryptocurrencies. See for example https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Cryptocurrency_wallet and Sarah Hansen (2018) ‘Guide To Top Cryptocurrency Exchanges’, Forbes, 20 
June, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahhansen/2018/06/20/forbes-guide-to-cryptocurrency-ex-
changes/.
7 Information from the Presidency, 6 November 2019, see https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
13571-2019-INIT/en/pdf.
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an optimal balance between effectiveness and security of the system. 
Such a centralised system avoids the excess use of natural resources and will be fast to 
operate. However, centralised systems in the hands of a limited number of association mem-
bers pose the risk of collusion (Abadi and Brunnermeier, 2019) to the detriment of users. 
The Libra Association (2019) has been explicit about the fact that “an important objective 
of the Libra Association is to move towards increasing decentralisation over time”. This will only 
be possible however once new technical solutions provide the power and stability to engage 
at the scale Libra aspires to. Until this is solved, the Libra Association will be the authority to 
trust to give permission for Libra transactions. Whether the association will be a trustworthy 
custodian of the ledger remains to be seen.
2.3 A provider of stable value?
Although popular, Bitcoin’s high volatility has so far prevented the cryptocurrency from 
becoming a credible alternative to traditional money. The rationale behind Libra and other 
stablecoins is exactly to correct for that, by ensuring stable value. 
One of the essential problems of the first generation of cryptocurrencies (such as Bitcoin) 
or even of previous attempts to build a stablecoin (such as Basis) is that they are fiat curren-
cies without the explicitly backing of a credible issuer, such as the state. And just like any 
other fiat currency, they are inherently vulnerable to changes in beliefs and expectations that 
can lead to undesirable self-fulfilling inflationary episodes. 
Libra, by contrast, will not be a fiat currency but will be backed by reserves composed of 
a basket of liquid and stable assets (themselves in official credible fiat currencies)8. Libra’s 
issuance should work as follows: for any Libra minted, there needs to be a unit of a basket of 
assets. The Association controlling Libra will decide on the composition of this basket, with 
the intention to keep its value stable. Authorised resellers would purchase Libra coins from 
the Association in exchange for assets labelled in credible fiat currencies to fully back the new 
coins that are added to the reserves. Reserves are supposed to be fully invested in low-risk 
short-dated interest-bearing assets, the revenues from which will serve to cover operating 
costs and pay out dividends to the founding members of the Association. Users can request 
Libras from authorised resellers.
It has been argued that such a set up looks like a currency board. The custodian of the 
board aims to preserve the value of the basket. It should be compared more correctly to a 
simple investment fund guaranteeing redemption at par, which should at least in principle 
make it less vulnerable to self-fulfilling inflationary equilibrium. As long as the Libra 
Association backs each Libra coin with an identical pool of safe and liquid assets, its value 
should be stable.
However, at some point the Libra Association might be tempted to renege on its promise 
and to not back each coin fully, or to change the composition of the pool of assets in order to 
increase its own profits. For the moment, we can only assume that the Association’s motive is 
profit maximisation, which is different to any monetary policy authority’s objective. 
The problem arises because there might be a conflict between maintaining a stable price 
for Libra (which implies the issuer honouring the initial pledge at any price) and profit 
maximisation (which gives the issuer the incentive to deviate from full collateralisation and a 
stable basket). As discussed by Chang and Velasco (2019), the incentives are wrong, and noth-
ing currently would stop the Libra Association from changing the rules on redeemability and 
the degree of collateralisation. On the contrary, the Libra Association (2019) mentions that 
the portfolio backing Libra can be adjusted at will by the association9. Given that seigniorage 
profits go to the association and not the users, there is a clear incentive to maximise these 
8 Although important details are not described in the Libra Association white paper (Libra Association, 2019).
9 The Libra Association white paper explicitly mentions that “the association can change the reserve basket” (Libra 
Association, 2019)
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profits either by changing the weights, by investing in riskier and less liquid assets10, or even 
by moving to partial backing. Eventually, the Libra Association could even drop the backing 
entirely and become a fiat currency to enjoy full seigniorage profits. But at that point, the 
Libra would become a regular fiat cryptocurrency (which means it will be subject to self-ful-
filling crises) and would no longer be a stablecoin. 
The value of Libra will depend crucially on the Libra Association’s commitment to keep 
it stable. But unlike central banks that have a public function and are accountable to citizens 
to fulfil their stability mandate, the Association is not bound by a similar commitment, but 
pursues profit maximisation.
3 Should central banks issue their own 
digital currencies?
3.1 What are CBDCs?
There is no universally agreed definition of what constitutes a central bank digital currency 
(CBDC), but the term has become commonly used11 to designate any form of central bank 
digital fiat liability that is accessible to all economic agents. 
As our taxonomy shows (Figure 1), CBDCs could take various forms. First, a CBDC could 
be issued in a centralised fashion though accounts at the central banks. This actually already 
exists in the form of reserves held by commercial banks at the central bank. The novelty of a 
CBDC would be that it would allow the general public to maintain directly deposit accounts 
at central banks, as they do at commercial banks. Second, a CBDC could also be issued in 
a decentralised fashion as a crypto-CBDC based on distributed ledger technology (DLT), 
which, once issued by the central bank, could then be transferred from one individual to 
another independently from the central bank. Finally, a CBDC could also take a hybrid physi-
cal-digital form with pre-paid cards or mobile wallets containing digital currencies.
We consider the last two versions of CBDCs less relevant for different reasons: 1) for cryp-
to-CBDCs, DLT is an immature technology that is currently less efficient, slower and much 
more energy-intensive than a centralised system. The only advantage it offers is anonymity 
(which is valuable for individuals, but would probably be considered highly undesirable by 
monetary authorities, as it could facilitate illegal activities); 2) cards/wallets meanwhile would 
have properties very similar to cash and are thus not worth analysing in more detail. 
We therefore focus on the more promising version of CBDC: deposit accounts at the cen-
tral bank available to all.
3.2 What would be the purpose of CBDCs?
Interest in CBDCs on the part of authorities is partly motivated by the popularity of private 
digital currencies that could challenge the role of official currencies. Providing digital curren-
cies issued by the central bank could possibly make private digital currencies less attractive 
and slow down their adoption. Allowing households and companies to open accounts at the 
central bank would give them direct access to efficient and instantaneous retail payment 
systems – such as the Target Instant Payment Settlement service that European banks can 
already use to exchange reserves. This would remove one reason for switching to a private 
digital currency with a better payment system. But there are other reasons why introducing 
CBDCs could be useful.
10 This is particularly true in the current low rate environment in which safe assets might have negative yields in 
some countries.
11 See for instance Meaning et al (2018) for a detailed discussion on the definition of a CBDC.
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One important reason for central banks to provide CBDCs to citizens is that if cash is 
scarce or even disappears, citizens will lose direct access to sovereign money, the ultimate 
safe asset (as long as the central bank implements the necessary policies to maintain the 
value of the currency, ie low inflation and stable foreign exchange rates). Should cash disap-
pear, citizens would only have access to bank deposits, which are not as safe, to store value. 
Deposits above a certain threshold (€100,000 in the euro area) are uninsured, and even below 
this threshold, there is the possibility of losing access to savings even for a few days or weeks. 
In addition, the lack of direct access to the central bank currency could lead to a mor-
al-hazard problem (Brunnermeier et al, 2019). If banks do not ‘fear’ convertibility of their 
deposits into central bank currency, they could lose some of the incentives (even though 
regulation would still be a major disciplining device) to manage well their solvency and 
liquidity risks. In extremis, if deposits do not have to be converted into a common currency, 
deposits from different commercial banks could at some point become imperfect substitutes 
for one another. In this case, there would be ‘exchange rates’ between them, depending on 
the trustworthiness of the particular issuer, as it was the case during the US free banking era 
in the nineteenth century. CBDCs would solve this problem by allowing households to access 
central bank currency in a new form, and thus restore the convertibility threat for banks. 
The introduction of CBDCs could also strengthen monetary policy by transmitting it 
directly to the general public. Changes in policy rates would be transmitted directly to CBDC 
depositors, in contrast to today’s situation, in which interest paid by commercial banks on 
deposits are relatively sticky12. This also means that CBDCs would make unconventional poli-
cies easier to implement. 
First, as long as the CBDC is interest-bearing, it could help relax further the zero lower 
bound constraint because interest rates applied to the CBDC could be negative (unlike for 
banknotes). The abolition of cash would make this effect stronger. However, abolishing cash 
might be not desirable, because cash could still be useful at least as a back-up for a CBDC in 
case of a technical failure or cyberattack, and for privacy reasons. But even if cash continues 
to exist, as long as its use is inconvenient (which would be even more the case if CBDC were 
introduced) and its storage costly, implementing negative rates on CBDC holdings would be 
possible.
Second, CBDCs could reduce one of the potential side effects of quantitative easing (QE), 
especially when asset purchases are coupled with negative rates. Currently, central bank bond 
purchases from non-bank institutions create additional reserves that are inevitably held by 
the commercial banks that host the accounts of the non-bank sellers in the deposit facility of 
the central bank, because non-banks cannot hold reserves directly. On aggregate, this means 
that banks cannot control fully the quantity of reserves they want to hold. When rates are neg-
ative, as they are at time of writing, this becomes costly for banks and might result in potential 
side effects such as increased rates for lending to the real economy. If non-banks could hold 
CBDCs directly, QE would not affect the banking sector negatively.
Finally, provided the concept of helicopter money is an acceptable monetary policy tool, 
it would be easier to implement if all citizens had accounts at the central bank, because the 
central bank would be able to credit their accounts with CBDC units.
3.3 The potential risks of CBDCs 
The introduction of CBDCs is sufficiently disruptive that it could pose a number of risks. 
First, one the main fears of policymakers (see, for example, Coeuré, 2018) is that CBDCs 
will lead to cyclical bank runs. If households and companies have access to central-bank 
reserves, there is a risk of a flight-to-safety from commercial-bank deposits to CBDCs in each 
economic downturn. This type of run from banks to the central bank happened in the 1930s 
during the Great Depression in France, when it was possible for non-banks to maintain 
12 In the euro area, before the crisis when policy rates were high, interest on bank deposits was significantly lower, 
while now the opposite is true, as shown by Bindseil (2019).
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accounts at the Banque de France (Baubeau et al, 2018). Bank runs are already possible today 
by withdrawing cash or transferring deposits between banks13, but the main concern is that 
digital bank runs towards CBDCs would be easier and happen more rapidly than traditional 
bank runs.
In addition to this cyclical financial stability risk, another serious, more structural, risk 
would be the reduction of financial intermediation. Banks would compete with the central 
bank to hold deposits. It is very difficult to predict what would happen, because it would 
depend on the particular properties of the CBDC introduced and on the behaviour of the 
central bank after its introduction, but this could lead to different outcomes (as explained, for 
instance, by Stevens, 2018).
A first possible outcome could be an evolution towards a financial system characterised 
by narrow(er) banks that are less reliant on deposits. Banks could either offer higher returns 
to depositors to try to retain their deposit base, or they could rely on other sources of financ-
ing. This would have profound implications, both potentially positive and negative. The extra 
competition from CBDCs would reduce the monopoly power of the banking sector and allow 
depositors to obtain higher returns from their deposits. For banks, by definition, the effect 
would be the opposite because they could be forced to rely on more expensive and potentially 
less stable sources of funding, such as the wholesale market14. This new banking model would 
make banks look more like investment funds, which could be less stable thus requiring an 
adjustment of the financial safety net. The need for traditional deposit insurance would be 
reduced because deposits could be kept safely in the form of CBDCs. However, if we consider 
that the maturity transformation provided by banks is a valuable service, then it needs to be 
protected from liquidity risk. Either insurance cover for banks’ short-term liabilities would 
have to be broadened to include wholesale funding, with all the risks that this would entail 
(but the alternative would be frequent ‘wholesale runs’ such as those that happened during 
the last financial crisis), or regulation would have to be toughened significantly to avoid any 
maturity mismatch on banks’ balance sheets, for example by forcing them to be financed 
mainly through equity and long-term debt.
Another possibility would be a tightening of credit conditions by banks if they are unable 
to retain depositors or attract new sources of funding. This tightening would lead to less lend-
ing and/or at a higher price, which would, all else being equal, result in a significant drag on 
investment and ultimately on economic activity.
3.4 How could central banks minimise these risks?
Policymakers have several tools at their disposal, should bank runs become more frequent 
as a result of the introduction of CBDCs. First, deposit insurance offsets the risk of runs when 
deposits are within the guaranteed amount. Second, the central bank should play its crucial 
role of lender of last resort by providing liquidity through loans to the banks that suffer runs, 
as long as they are solvent. The financial instability episodes in France in the 1930s discussed 
in Baubeau et al (2018) showed that the main problem was not the bank runs (towards the 
central bank or towards other saving institutions) per se but rather the strong “gold standard 
mentality” prevailing at the Banque de France at the time. This mentality prevented the cen-
tral bank from playing its role lender of last resort and from replacing the shortfall in deposits 
held at commercial banks with central bank loans to avoid a strong credit crunch. 
Central banks would also have various instruments to counter the risk of structural finan-
13 Actually, in France in the 1930s, the run from commercial banks towards safer savings institutions (caisses 
d’épargne) was even more significant than that towards central bank accounts. Similarly, Bindseil (2019) showed 
that during the European financial crisis (2008-12) transferring deposits from what were perceived as weak banks 
to stronger banks was a much more important form of run than conversion of bank deposits into cash.
14 This could also have the additional side effect of cutting banks off from their client base in terms of selling them 
other services generally bundled with deposit holding, including mortgages and overdraft facilities. Banks could 
also be stopped from acting as intermediaries between their clients and investment funds, insurance companies, 
etc, which would reduce the fees they receive on such activities and thus their overall profits.
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cial disintermediation that could happen as a result of the introduction of CBDC, if it was con-
sidered an unfavourable evolution that could endanger price or financial stability. The central 
bank’s reaction would thus vary depending on the magnitude of the problem.
In moderate cases, such as if the quantity of credit provided by banks is not significantly 
affected, but banks ask for higher lending interest rates (for example because they need to 
increase the returns paid to depositors to retain them), the central bank would have to lower 
its policy rates structurally to offset this effect and maintain financial conditions at the same 
(presumably adequate) level, all else being equal. In normal times this should not be a par-
ticular problem, but at a time when the effective lower bound is binding, it might be problem-
atic, and might involve the increased use of unconventional monetary policies. 
If disintermediation becomes a more significant issue and there is clear downward pres-
sure on bank credit availability, the main way for the central bank to offset this trend would 
be to provide structurally more funding to the commercial banks to replace the lost deposits, 
so that they can maintain the same level of financing to the economy. This means the central 
bank balance sheet would have to become structurally much bigger15 and also more exposed 
to the banking sector than has traditionally been the case. 
The debate on the optimal size of central banks’ balance sheets has not so far been set-
tled16. However, the two main risks for central banks in increasing massively their refinancing 
operations would be:
• First, the central bank would take more risks onto its balance sheet because it would be 
more exposed to the risks faced by banks: in a way, the central bank would become itself 
a financial intermediary between depositors that would hold CBDCs and the commercial 
banks.
• Second, this means that the central bank would be involved more directly in the credit 
allocation process. In order to be able to provide a much greater amount of refinancing to 
the banks, the central bank might have to adjust significantly its collateral framework so 
that banks are able to access its operations at a sufficient scale. Central banks’ decisions 
on collateral eligibility and haircuts are often perceived as purely technical decisions, 
but they are not always as neutral as they seem (Claeys and Goncalves Raposo, 2018). In 
particular, deciding to include new asset classes as eligible collateral (in order to increase 
the pool so that banks can obtain more refinancing) could have some powerful effects 
on credit allocation by the banks. The main advantage is that this would give the central 
bank greater control over the macroeconomic situation, but the drawback would be that 
it could potentially make the overall allocation of resources in the economy less efficient, 
and could also have some distributional effects (that should preferably be in the hands of 
citizens or elected officials).  
To avoid the extreme situation in which deposit accounts held at the central bank would 
fully crowd out bank deposits, the central bank could also try to carefully calibrate the prop-
erties of CBDCs in order to reduce ex ante the incentive to use a CBDC as a main store of 
value. The simplest way to do this would be through its remuneration system. CBDC accounts 
should be remunerated at a rate below other policy rates (which could both reduce the 
structural disintermediation risk and the frequency of bank runs). However, the returns from 
CBDCs should not be so disadvantageous that their use as a medium of exchange becomes 
unattractive. In particular, when policy rates are negative, a portion of CBDC holdings could 
be exempted from the negative rates to avoid the negative impact on small savers (and also 
so that households are not given a reason to switch back to holding cash). Bindseil (2019) 
15  Bindseil (2019) estimated that in the euro area, in extremis, if all bank deposits needed to be replaced by the Euro-
pean Central Bank, the increase of central bank credit to commercial banks would be €4 trillion, or a doubling of 
the size of the ECB’s balance sheet.
16  See section 4.1 in Claeys and Demertzis (2017) for a summary of this debate.
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proposed a very practical system to put that in place with a two-tier remuneration system for 
CBDCs: below a threshold of €3,500, CBDC holdings would be remunerated at the maximum 
level between the deposit rate and 0, and above that threshold CBDC holdings would be 
remunerated at the deposit rate minus 200 basis points. These numbers are indicative and the 
central bank would need to experiment to find the right balance, so that it incentivises the use 
of CBDCs as a medium of exchange, and gives access to everyone to the ultimate safe asset 
when necessary (especially if cash disappears), but disincentivises use of these accounts as a 
main store of value in normal times.
3.5 Who else could provide an equivalent to CBDCs?
Finally, an alternative solution to give the general public access to digital central bank liabil-
ities would be not to provide it directly through a CBDC, but to do it indirectly through what 
could be considered ‘full-reserve banks’ (sometimes also referred to as ‘narrow banks’17). 
The idea, as described for example by Adrian and Mancini-Griffoli (2019), would be to 
allow new entities to hold reserve balances at the central bank, subject to some specific 
conditions. These entities would have a very particular balance sheet with only central bank 
reserves as assets (they would not give credit, nor buy any other type of asset) and only simple 
deposits as liabilities (they probably would not need to hold much capital, if any at all, given 
the absence of risk from their portfolios). The entity would pass the remuneration of central 
bank reserves to depositors and earn a small fee for the service provided. 
This system would allow households and companies to hold indirectly the central bank 
currency and would have two additional advantages. First, it would allow central banks to 
focus on their mandates and not use their resources to provide direct services to their new 
customers (which could also have some negative reputational consequences for central 
banks if not handled properly). If all households and companies in the euro area opened 
CBDC accounts at the ECB, the number of accounts in the Eurosystem would grow from 
around 10,000 to more than 500 million (Bindseil, 2019). Second, as argued by Bordo and 
Levin (2019), this would help prevent a conflict of interest for the central bank. Competition 
from a CBDC could be considered unfair by banks given the crucial role central banks play in 
the organisation of the banking sector (for instance as a supervisor, among other functions). 
For all these reasons, privately-managed alternatives to CBDCs should not be discarded by 
central banks. Rather, they should be considered as one way to provide CBDCs (which would 
represent an acceptable form of stablecoin labelled in the central bank unit of account) to the 
general public.
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